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Abstract
Micro-level empirical evidence suggests that plant managers adjust production by uti-
lizing capital along nonconvex margins. Existing models of the monetary transmission
mechanism (MTM), however, assume that production units adjust output smoothly. The
objective of this paper is to determine whether such plant-level nonconvexities affect the
MTM in a quantitatively signiﬁcant way. To this end we replace the smooth produc-
tion function in a prototypical model of the MTM with heterogeneous plants that adjust
output along three nonconvex margins: intermittent production, shiftwork, and weekend
work. We calibrate the model such that steady-state utilization of these margins is in
line with U.S. data. We ﬁnd that the nonconvexities dampen the responses of aggregate
economic activity and prices to monetary policy shocks by about 50 percent relative to
the standard model, thereby signiﬁcantly reducing the effectiveness of the MTM. Due to
heterogeneity and discrete choices at the plant level, monetary policy affects the output
decisions of only “marginal” plants – those close to being indifferent between alterna-
tive production plans. In equilibrium the measure of such plants is rather small. In
addition, contrary to popular belief, the quantitative effects of monetary policy shocks
on aggregate output do not signiﬁcantly change with the degree of capacity utilization
over the business cycle. The effects on inﬂation, however, do change substantially over
the business cycle when monetary policy shocks are persistent.
JEL Codes: E22, E23, E32, E52.
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Nontechnical Summary
Micro-levelempirical evidence suggeststhat plant managers in manymanufacturing industries
adjust production by utilizing capital along nonconvex margins. For example, when a plant
manager wants to achieve a lower volume of output, he reduces the number of weeks the
plant is scheduled to be open, drops weekend work, or reduces the number of shifts. Output
adjustments at the micro level are thus lumpy.
Despite such observed nonconvexities, one characteristic of existing models of the monetary
transmission mechanism (MTM) – the process through which monetary policy decisions are
transmitted into the economy – is that production units have access to a smooth (aggregate)
production function. The objective of this paper is to determine whether incorporating non-
convex margins of output adjustment at the micro level into an otherwise standard model of
the MTM affects the model’s properties in a quantitatively signiﬁcant way. In particular, we
examine the extent to which the nonconvexities affect the responses of aggregate economic
activity and prices to monetary policy shocks.
We construct an economy similar in many respects to the model of liquidity effects developed
by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). Instead of assuming an aggregate production func-
tion, however, production in our model takes place at individual plants that differ in terms of
productivity. The plant manager can adjust the plant’s output by utilizing capital along three
nonconvex margins. First, he can operate the plant or let it remain idle. Second, he can choose
the number of straight-time shifts. Third, he can run overtime (weekend) shifts in addition to
straight-time shifts.
We calibrate the economy such that the steady-state fraction of plants operating a given shift
or using weekend work is in line with U.S. plant-level data. We further ensure that in a steady
state the economy can be interpreted as a disaggregated version of the original Christiano and
Eichenbaum economy, and that the cyclical behavior of output in the two economies is the
same. This makes our model quantitatively comparable with Christiano and Eichenbaum’s
model, which we take as a benchmark for our experiments. We then compare how the two
economies respond to monetary policy shocks.
We ﬁnd that the nonconvexities dampen the responses by about 50 percent, thereby signiﬁ-
cantly reducing the effectiveness of the MTM. Due to heterogeneity and discrete choices at
the plant level, in equilibrium monetary policy shocks affect the output decisions of only a
small measure of “marginal” plants that are close to being indifferent between alternative pro-
duction plans. We also explore the possibility that the measure of such plants can change over
the business cycle. Some researchers suggest that monetary policy should be more effective in
recessions than expansions because in recessions ﬁrms have more spare capacity and conse-
quently can expand output more easily. We ﬁnd that this is not the case. In our model, capacity
utilization varies substantially over the business cycle, but the measure of the marginal plants
that change production in response to monetary policy shocks stays roughly the same.Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 3
1. Introduction
Micro-levelempirical evidence suggeststhat plant managers in manymanufacturing industries
adjust production by utilizing capital along nonconvex margins. For example, when a plant
manager wants to achieve a lower volume of output, he reduces the number of weeks the
plant is scheduled to be open, drops weekend work, or reduces the number of shifts. Output
adjustments at the micro level are thus lumpy.
Despite such observed nonconvexities, one characteristic of existing models of the monetary
transmission mechanism (MTM) – the process through which monetary policy decisions are
transmitted into the economy – is that production units have access to a smooth (aggregate)
production function. The objective of this paper is to determine whether incorporating non-
convex margins of output adjustment at the micro level into an otherwise standard model of
the MTM affects the model’s properties in a quantitatively signiﬁcant way. In particular, we
examine the extent to which the nonconvexities affect the responses of aggregate economic
activity and prices to monetary policy shocks.
We ﬁnd that the nonconvexities dampen the responses by about 50 percent, thereby signiﬁ-
cantly reducing the effectiveness of the MTM. Due to heterogeneity and discrete choices at
the plant level, in equilibrium monetary policy shocks affect output decisions of only a small
measure of “marginal” plants that are close to being indifferent between alternative production
plans. We also explore the possibility that the measure of such plants can change over the
business cycle. Some researchers suggest that monetary policy should be more effective in
recessions than expansions because in recessions ﬁrms have more spare capacity and conse-
quently can expand output more easily. We ﬁnd that this is not the case. In our model, capacity
utilization varies substantially over the business cycle, but the measure of the marginal plants
that change production in response to monetary policy shocks stays roughly the same.
The importance of nonconvex margins of capital utilization for output adjustments at the plant
level has been well documented by empirical studies. For example, Bresnahan and Ramey
(1994)ﬁndthatplantmanagersinthe automobileindustryadjustoutputbyclosingtheplantfor
a week at atime, by schedulingSaturday work, or bychangingthe numberof shifts. According
to the authors’ estimates, these margins account for 80 to 90 percent of output volatility at the
microlevel. Bresnahan andRamey’sﬁndingshavebeen broadlysupportedbyHall(2000), also
for the automobile industry, and Mattey and Strongin (1997) for manufacturing, especially for
industries characterized by assembly production. Further, lumpy adjustments in plant-level
employment have been well documented by Caballero and Engel (1993), Caballero, Engel,
and Haltiwanger (1997), and Hamermesh (1989).1
We construct an economy similar in many respects to the model of liquidity effects developed
by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).2 In their economy, the MTM consists of two effects:
the liquidity effect and the output effect. Due to limited participation of households in the
money market along the lines suggested by Lucas (1990), a monetary injection lowers both
nominal and real interest rates (the liquidity effect). A lower real interest rate reduces produc-
1 Nonconvex production margins are also a key element in the literature on inventories (Ramey, 1991; Cooper
and Haltiwanger, 1992).
2 Other popular models of the MTM include models with nominal rigidities (such as sticky prices or wages) and
models with credit market imperfections. See Mishkin (1995) for a review of the literature.4 Roman ˇ Sustek
tion costs of ﬁrms, which ﬁnance working capital through bank loans. Lower production costs
then induce ﬁrms to increase demand for labor and expand output (the output effect).3
In our model we keep the mechanism behind the liquidity effect as in the Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) paper and focus on the output effect. Instead of assuming an aggregate
production function, production in our model takes place at individual plants that differ in
terms of productivity. The plant manager can adjust the plant’s output by utilizing capital
along three nonconvex margins. First, he can operate the plant or let it remain idle. In this
respect our model is similar to the one developed by Cooley, Hansen, and Prescott (1995) and
Hansen and Prescott (2000). Second, the manager can choose the number of straight-time
shifts.
This is similar to Burnside (2000), Halevy and Nason (2002), and Hornstein (2002). Finally,
in the spirit of Hansen and Sargent (1988), the manager can run overtime (weekend) shifts in
addition to straight-time shifts.4
We calibrate the economy such that the steady-state fraction of plants operating a given shift
or using weekend work is in line with U.S. plant-level data. We further ensure that in a steady
state the economy can be interpreted as a disaggregated version of the original Christiano and
Eichenbaum economy, and that the cyclical behavior of output in the two economies is the
same. This makes our model quantitatively comparable with Christiano and Eichenbaum’s
model, which we take as a benchmark for our experiments. We then compare how the two
economies respond to monetary policy shocks. Output, employment, and the inﬂation rate
increase in both economies following an unanticipated fall in the nominal interest rate. In
the economy with nonconvexities, however, they increase about 50 percent less than in the
benchmark economy.
Focusing on one particular margin, for example, shutting the plant down, the intuition behind
the result is as follows. Consider a highly unproductive plant that is shut down. Other things
being equal, an interest rate cut reduces the plant’s potential losses, but does not make the
plant proﬁtable enough to induce the manager to operate it. Similarly, an interest rate increase
reduces the proﬁt of a highly productive plant, but not enough to induce the manager to shut it
down. Only plants on the margin (i.e., close to the break-even point) change their output and
employment decisions in response to interest rate movements. For parameter values consistent
withU.S. data, themeasure of such marginalplants, for any of the three nonconvexmarginswe
consider, is rather small. Labor demand in the model with nonconvexities therefore increases
less in response to a fall in the interest rate than in the standard model.
Most of the increase in labor demand in the model with nonconvexities, however, is attributed
to higher demand by relatively more productive plants that can increase output further only by
operating a night shift. Because households prefer daytime work to night work, in equilibrium
the average wage rate in the model with nonconvexities increases more than the wage rate in
3 This monetary transmission mechanism has been further exploited by Altig, Carlstrom, and Lansing (1995),
Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1995), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), and Fuerst (1992). Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994, 1999) provide empirical evidence on the liquidity effect, while Barth and Ramey
(2001) present evidence on the output effect.
4 Themaindifferencebetweenproductionin oureconomyandproductionin HalevyandNason(2002),Hornstein
(2002), and Hansen and Sargent (1988) is that these papers introduce shiftwork or overtime work directly into an
aggregate production function.Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 5
the standard model. This effect further reduces the relative effectiveness of the MTM in the
model with non-convexities.
We obtain this result for responses from a steady state. We therefore also explore the pos-
sibility that the measure of the marginal plants can substantially change, and thus that the
magnitude of the responses to monetary policy shocks may be signiﬁcantly different, when
aggregate productivity shocks move the economy away from the steady state. We ﬁnd that for
productivity shocks of plausible magnitudes, the responses of output change only negligibly
and the responses of the inﬂation rate change signiﬁcantly only when monetary policy shocks
are persistent. This is despite the fact that aggregate productivity shocks in our model gen-
erate ﬂuctuations in aggregate output and capacity utilization (measured by the workweek of
capital) of the same order of magnitude as in U.S. data.5
The importance of nonconvexities at the micro level for aggregate variables has been studied
previously in the context of the business cycle. For example, in Hansen (1985) households can
either work a ﬁxed number of hours or not work at all. This nonconvexity has an important
aggregate implication: the aggregate intertemporal elasticity of labor supply is much higher
than the elasticity of the individual units being aggregated. On the other hand, Thomas (2002)
demonstrates that lumpy plant-level investment has little effect on business cycle behavior of
aggregate investment. We are not aware of any study, however, that evaluates the importance
of micro-level nonconvexities for the MTM.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the two model economies, the benchmark
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) economy and the economy with nonconvexities. Section
3 describes the models’ calibration and Section 4 presents the quantitative ﬁndings. Section
5 concludes and provides suggestions for future research. The algorithm used to compute the
equilibria is described in the Appendix.
2. Model Economies
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the economic environment common to both economies. Then,
we characterize the optimal plans for one part of the household’s problem that is shared by
both models. Finally, we introduce into the common framework the production side of each
economy and the labor-leisure choice of the household associated with it.
2.1 The Economic Environment
The economies are populated by a representative household, ﬁrm, and ﬁnancial intermediary
that take all prices as given. Prices are ﬂexible. In Economy 1, the benchmark economy,
the representative ﬁrm operates just one (representative) production plant. In Economy 2, the
economy with nonconvexities, the ﬁrm operates a continuum of (heterogeneous) plants. There
is also a monetary authority that issues ﬁat money.
5 ´ Alvarez (2003) ﬁnds a positive relationship between capacity utilization and the effectiveness of monetary
policy. His model differs from ours in two main respects. First, in his economy demand shocks rather than
productivity shocks drive variation in capacity utilization. Second, and more importantly, his model abstracts
from plant-level nonconvexities.6 Roman ˇ Sustek
The environment is nearly identical to the one in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).6 At the
beginning of period t the household owns capital stock, kt, and balances of ﬁat money, mt.
Each period the household is also endowed with one unit of time, which it allocates between
leisure and labor.
After learning the current productivityzt of capital and labor, the householddecides how much
moneyitwill keep as cash, qt.7 The remainingpart of the household’smoneybalances, mt−qt,
is deposited with the ﬁnancial intermediary. At the end of the period the household receives
interest earnings Rt(mt−qt), where Rt is the (gross) nominal interest rate set by the monetary
authority. The nominal interest rate is revealed after the household has chosen qt. (We discuss
this assumption below.)
The household derives utility from the consumption of goods produced by the ﬁrm, ct, and
leisure, lt. (In Economy 2 the household also has preferences over the time when leisure
is consumed.) Consumption expenditures must be ﬁnanced with cash that comes from two
sources: qt and the current-period nominal labor income et, which the household earns in
return for supplying labor services to the ﬁrm. Investment, it, does not have to be purchased
with cash.
The household chooses ct, it, and lt after learning Rt. The period t consumption, investment,
and leisure thus depend on zt, Rt, kt, and mt, whereas cash balances depend on zt, kt, mt, and
Rt−1. This information structure, common to models with liquidityeffects, captures the notion
that at the time the central bank sets the interest rate, some agents, in this case the household,
do not participate in the money market.8 As we discuss below, limited participation in the
money market is what generates liquidity effects.
The ﬁrm rents capital and labor services from the household after observing both zt and Rt. Its
wage bill, equal to et, must be paid before the ﬁrm sells its output and is fully ﬁnanced through
a bank loan. At the end of the period, the loan is repaid (with interest) using the proceeds from
sales, and proﬁts, πFt, are distributed to the household.
The ﬁnancial intermediary takes deposits from the household and issues loans to the ﬁrm.
Intermediation is costless. Besides deposits the intermediary obtains funds from lump-sum
injections Xt of ﬁat money from the monetary authority. Total loanable funds at the interme-
diary’s disposal are thus equal to mt−qt+Xt.9 Free entry ensures that the interest rate charged
for loans is equal to the interest rate paid on deposits. At the end of the period, after paying the
household its interest earnings, the intermediary is left with net cash position in the amount of
RtXt. This amount is distributed to the household in the form of proﬁts πBt.
6 It differs from Christiano and Eichenbaum’s framework only in two respects. First, in their model capital is
owned by the ﬁrm whereas here it is owned by the household. The ﬁrm then rents capital services from the
household. This modiﬁcation has no effect on equilibrium allocations and prices. Second, in Christiano and
Eichenbaum’s model, the growth rate of ﬁat money is exogenous, and the nominal interest rate, the price that
clears the money market, is determined endogenously. In our models this is reversed. The nominal interest rate is
exogenous (set arbitrarily by the monetary authority) and the money growth rate is determined within the model.
Such an institutional arrangement allows for a more straightforward discussion of our results.
7 We will be more speciﬁc about zt when we describe the details of the ﬁrm’s problem. In Economy 1 z t is the
Solow residual. In Economy 2 it is closely related to the Solow residual.
8 The theoretical justiﬁcation for limited participation based on ﬁxed costs of portfolio adjustment has been de-
veloped by Alvarez and Atkenson (1997), Alvarez, Atkenson, and Kehoe (1999), Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber
(2001), and Occhino (2001).
9 Note that in this environment the intermediary does not create inside money.Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 7
The productivityshock zt and the net nominal interest rate (Rt−1) followstochastic processes
log(zt+1)=( 1− ρz)log(z)+ρz log(zt)+ξt+1 (2.1)
and




+ ρz log(Rt − 1) + ζt+1, (2.2)
respectively, where ρz, ρR ∈ (0,1) and z and R are the nonstochastic steady-state levels of
productivity and the gross interest rate, respectively. The innovations, ξt and ζt, are normally
distributed with mean zero and standard deviations σξ and σζ, respectively.10
The money supply (Xt + mt) must be such that the money market clears at the interest rate
the monetary authority wants to implement. That is,
mt + Xt = et + qt (2.3)
must hold for a given Rt. Ceteris paribus, when the authority decides to reduce the interest
rate, it must increase the supply of ﬁat money through Xt. Due to the restriction on the ability
of the household to adjust its deposits, a fall in the interest rate is consistent with a money
supply increase. Since the household does not participate in the money market at the time of
the injection, the ﬁrm must hold the extra cash in the economy. It is willing to do so only if
it is charged a lower interest rate on loans. Without restricting the household’s participation
in the money market, a monetary expansion would be fully reﬂected in a price level increase,
and the interest rate would be determined by Fisherian fundamentals (i.e., expectations about
the future real rate of return on capital and the inﬂation rate).11 Finally, the aggregate stock of
ﬁat money evolves as
mt+1 = mt + Xt. (2.4)
2.2 The (Partial) Household’s Problem
Here we describe the representative household’s problem of how much of its money stock to
keep as cash and how much of its income to consume. These two problems are the same in the
two economies and, for a utility function separable in consumption and leisure, can be solved
independently from the labor-leisure choice. The labor-leisure choice is economy-speciﬁc and
we describe it separately for each economy.






t [log(ct) − vt], (2.5)
10 Although it might be more realistic to assume the interest rate is dictated by a feedback rule, such as the Taylor
rule,weuse asimpleexogenousprocessinorderto eliminatetheeffectoftheruleontheeconomy. Thisfacilitates
a clearer analysis of the transmission mechanism itself.
11 Because the ﬁrm’s loan is ultimately used to ﬁnance household consumption, a monetary injection does in-
crease the price level to some extent even when liquidity effects are present. But the increase is in general smaller
than in a model where the household faces no restriction on its ability to adjust deposits. The reason is that a
lower interest rate reduceslabor costs, which leads to higheroutput. And to the extentthat consumptionincreases
with an increase in output, the economy’s money stock is used in a greater volume of transactions. Therefore,
in an economy with liquidity effects, the price level (the price that clears the goods market) increases less than
proportionally to the increase in the money stock.8 Roman ˇ Sustek
where vt isdisutilityfromworkinperiodt, θ ∈ (0,1)isthediscountfactor, andtheexpectation
operator Et reﬂects the information structure introduced in the previous subsection.12 We will
refer to the expression in the square brackets as the “instantaneous utility function”.
The household must obey three constraints. First, as mentioned above, it must obey the “cash-
in-advance” constraint
ptct ≤ qt + et, (2.6)
where pt is the price level. Second, it must obey the budget constraint
ptct + ptit + mt+1 ≤ qt + et + Rt (mt − qt)
+ptrtkt + πBt + πFt, (2.7)
where rt is the real rental rate at which the household rents capital services to the ﬁrm. Finally,
capital evolves according to the law of motion
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it, (2.8)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is a depreciation rate.
Ignoring for the moment the household’s labor-leisure choice, the household’s problem is to
choose contingency plans for ct, it, kt+1, qt, and mt+1 in order to maximize (2.5) subject to

























pt+1 (1 + rt+1 − δ) | zt,R t
 
. (2.10)
The ﬁrst condition pertains to the optimal choice of qt. It states that the household sets the
expected marginal utility a dollar buys today when kept as cash equal to the expected marginal
utility a dollar will buy tomorrow when deposited today. The second condition is associated
with the household’s optimal choice of it: the household trades off the expected marginal
beneﬁt of carrying over a unit of income from period t to period t+1in the form of ﬁat money
against the expected marginal beneﬁt of saving in the form of capital.14
12 Disutility from work will depend on the amount of labor supplied to the ﬁrm and, in Economy 2, in addition
on the time when it is supplied.
13 Since from the stochastic process (2.2) it follows that (Rt − 1) is always positive, constraints (2.6) and (2.7)
will hold with equality.
14 Since at the time the household chooses it aggregate uncertainty in period t has been fully revealed, all prices
are observed. We can therefore factor pt out of the expectation operator on the left-hand side of equation (2.10).Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 9
2.3 Economy 1: Aggregate Production Function and a Representative Plant
The ﬁrst economy abstracts from the plant-level nonconvexities. The economy is the same as
the one in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and serves as a benchmark for our experiments.
We therefore describe it only brieﬂy and refer the reader to the original paper for more details.






operated by a representative ﬁrm/plant unit. Here, yt is aggregate output, nt is aggregate
employment, and α ∈ (0,1). After observing zt and Rt, the plant chooses kt and nt in order
to maximize proﬁts
πFt = pt (yt − Rtωtnt − rtkt), (2.12)
where ωt is the period t real wage rate. The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem imply


























At this point, deﬁning At may seem redundant. Nevertheless, it will facilitate a better com-
parison of the two economies later in the text. Note that (ceteris paribus) a fall in the nominal
interest rate reduces labor costs and thus increases aggregate employment and output. The
nominal wage bill, and thus the ﬁrm’s demand for loans, is given by
et =( ptωt)nt. (2.17)
The labor-leisure choice in this economy is the same as in Hansen (1985); that is, labor is
indivisible and there is an insurance market where ex-ante identical households (of measure
one) can fully insure against idiosyncratic employment risk. The representative household’s
instantaneous utility function is therefore
log(ct) − bnt, (2.18)
where b>0 is a parameter.15 Note that this utility function is the same as the instantaneous
utility function in (2.5) with vt ≡ bnt. The household chooses nt in order to maximize (2.18),
15 The argument behind the utility function (2.18) is as follows. The households have instantaneous utility func-
tion log(ct)+alog(lt), wherea>0 is the relativeweight onutility fromleisure. Each householdcan eitherwork
h ∈ (0,1) hoursand consumelt =1−h units of leisure, or not work at all andconsume lt =1units of leisure. A
lottery determines which households work and which do not. Since the households are ex-ante identical, and the
instantaneousutility function is separable in consumptionand leisure, the households want to have the same level
of consumption regardless of their employment status. The existence of the insurance market makes such alloca-
tion possible. Since only a measure nt of households are employed, the representative household’s instantaneous
utility function is as in (2.18), where b ≡− alog(1 − h).10 Roman ˇ Sustek
subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (2.6) and the budget constraint (2.7), with nominal
labor income given by (2.17). The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is
ωt = bct. (2.19)
The equilibrium is characterized by stochastic sequences of ct, it, kt+1, qt, mt+1, Xt, nt, rt,
pt, and ωt that satisfy the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions (2.9), (2.10), and (2.19); the ﬁrm’s
ﬁrst-order conditions (2.13) and (2.14); the money market equilibrium condition (2.3), where
et is given by (2.17); the law of motion for mt given by (2.4); and the constraints of the
household’s problem (2.6)–(2.8).
2.4 Economy 2: Nonconvexities and Heterogeneity at the Plant Level
Production
In the second economy output adjustment at the plant level is lumpy. A representative ﬁrm
operates a continuum (of measure one) of production plants indexed by a pair of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks (s,ε). The shocks are independently and identically distributed across
plants and across time. They are drawn independently of each other from normal distributions
with density functions f(s;zt,σ s) and g(ε;κzt,σ  ), where the logarithm of zt follows the
stochastic process (2.1) and κ>0 is a ratio of the mean values of the two idiosyncratic
shocks. The reason for introducing two shocks is related to the information structure of the
plant manager we describe below.
Each period individual plants can adjust output along three margins: intermittent production
(i.e., shutting the plant down), shiftwork, and overtime work. In particular, each plant can
remain idle or operate one, two, or three shifts. (The shifts can be interpreted as a morning, af-
ternoon, and night shift.) Provided a plant operates a shift during regular hours, it can also run
that shift during overtime hours: in addition to a regular ﬁve-day workweek, the plant sched-
ules Saturday work for that shift.16 The volume of output plant (s,ε) generates by running the










t nβ if ηjt ≥ n
0 otherwise.
(2.20)
Here, α,β ∈ (0,1) and α + β ∈ (0,1), hR
j ∈ (0,1) is the length of the shift during the regular
workweek, and ηjt is the number of workers employed on that shift. The length of the period is
normalized to one and the fraction 5/7 represents the number of days in the regular workweek.










t nβ if ηjt ≥ n
0 otherwise. (2.21)
Here, ho
j ∈ (0,1) is the length of the shift on Saturdays, and the fraction 1/7 represents the
extra day that is added to the regular workweek. The shift lengths hR
j and ho
j are taken as
16 Modeling overtime work as running a shift on Saturdays is in line with empirical evidence, in particular for
assembly manufacturing (Bresnahan and Ramey, 1994; Mattey and Strongin, 1997).Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 11












The requirement that the number of workers on each shift must be greater or equal to n
if the shift is to generate positive output introduces a nonconvexity in the plant’s choice
set. This nonconvexity makes output adjustment at the plant level lumpy. Without such a
minimum-stafﬁng requirement, each plant would operate all three shifts and would adjust out-
put smoothly by varying the number of workers on each shift.18 Since the marginal product
of an additional worker beyond the threshold level n is zero, whereas (in equilibrium) the
marginal cost is positive, the plant will choose ηjt = n.
At the start of the period, after observing zt and Rt but before observing (s,ε) of the individual
plants, the ﬁrm rents capital from the household and allocates it to the plants. Once capital is
assigned to a plant, it cannot be changed within the period. Since prior to the realization of
plant-speciﬁc productivity shocks the plants are identical, the ﬁrm distributes capital across
them equally. After that each plant learns its productivity shock s and decides whether it
will operate that period, and, if it does, how many shifts it will run. Once the number of
shifts has been chosen, the plant cannot change it within the period. Each plant then learns its
productivity shock ε and decides whether to schedule Saturday work.
This timing captures in a simple form the behavior of establishments found in empirical stud-
ies:19 overtime is the most frequent margin of output adjustment, usually used in the short run
for small changes in production volumes; intermittent production and shiftwork are margins
used for medium-term, and rather signiﬁcant, output adjustments; and changes in capital stock
are long-term decisions about capacity.













jt is the real hourly wage rate for work on the shift during regular hours. When the













jt is the real hourly wage rate for overtime work.
17 The terms skα
t nβ and εkα
t nβ in the production functions (2.20) and (2.21) represent instantaneous production
ﬂows. The distinction between production ﬂows and volumes is in the spirit of Lucas (1970) and the subsequent
literature on the workweek of capital (e.g., Bils and Cho, 1994; Kydland and Prescott, 1988).
18 A minimum-stafﬁng requirement is characteristic for assembly-type technology: a minimum number of work-
ers aroundan assembly line is neededto operatethe line and the marginalproductof an additional workerbeyond
the critical number is small. Cooley, Hansen, and Prescott (1995), Hall (2000), and Hansen and Prescott (2000)
use a production structure similar in this respect to ours.
19 Again, see Bresnahan and Ramey (1994), Mattey and Strongin (1997), and Shapiro (1986).12 Roman ˇ Sustek
After learning ε, and conditional on operating the shift during regular hours, a plant schedules
Saturday work on the jth shift only if output produced during overtime hours is greater or
equal to the costs (2.24). Therefore, within plants operating the jth shift, plants that run the














g (ε;κzt,σ ε)dε. (2.26)
Output and proﬁts generated from overtime work on the jth shift by all plants that run the shift

















εg (ε;κzt,σ ε)dε (2.27)
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After observing s, but before knowing ε, a plant opens the jth shift only if the shift makes
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As we will see, in equilibrium, household preferences imply that the ﬁrst (regular-time) shift





The unconditional measure µo
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The ﬁrm’s proﬁts are obtained by summing the proﬁts from regular and overtime work on the












At the start of the period the ﬁrm chooses kt in order to maximize (2.36) subject to (2.26)–
(2.28) and (2.30)–(2.35). The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem then implies the equilib-
rium rental rate
rt = α   Atk
α−1
t , (2.37)
where   At is deﬁned as





































=   Atk
α
t . (2.39)
Note that the expressions for rt and yt have the same form as in Economy 1 (equations [2.14]
and [2.15]). They only differ from their Economy 1 counterparts in the deﬁnition of   At.







jt. (2.40)14 Roman ˇ Sustek


















work overtime, in addition to regular hours. Finally, the aggregate wage bill et, which equals




































Note that through its effect on φjt and λjt (equations [2.25] and [2.29]), a fall in Rt (other
thingsbeing equal) increases the measure of plantsthat operate any givenshiftor use overtime.
This increases aggregate employment and output. Similarly, a positive shock to zt increases
employment by increasing µR
j and µo
j. The shock has two effects on aggregate output: ﬁrst,
it increases the measure of plants that operate any given shift or use overtime; and second, it
increases their productivity.
Labor-Leisure Choice
As in Economy 1, there is a continuum of households of measure one that face idiosyncratic
employment risk against which they can fully insure. A household that is employed on the jth


























j if τ = o.
Here aj > 0 is the relative weight on utility from leisure. A household that does not work gets
log(c0t)+a0 log(l0),
where a0 > 0 and l0 =1 . A lottery determines which households work on which shift (and
whether they work overtime) and which households do not work. The probability of working
only regular hours on the jth shift is nR
jt; the probability of working overtime, in addition to
regular hours, is no









similar to the one in Hansen (1985), and outlined in footnote 15, implies that the representative
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where bR
j ≡− aj log(1 − hR
j ) and bo
j ≡− aj log(1 − hR
j − ho
j). As we will see in the next
















The household thus prefers morning shifts to afternoon and night shifts. Note that the instan-

















The representative household chooses {nR
j ,n o
j}3
j=1 in order to maximize the utility function
(2.44) subject to the cash-in-advance constraint(2.6) and the budget constraint (2.7), where the
nominal labor income et is given by (2.43). The optimal labor-leisure choice is characterized
























for j = {1,2,3}.
Equilibrium




j=1, rt, pt, and {ωR
jt,ω o
jt}3
j=1 that satisfy the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions (2.9),
(2.10), (2.45), and (2.46); the ﬁrm’s optimalityconditions(2.37), (2.41), and (2.42); the money
market equilibrium condition (2.3), where et is given by (2.43); the law of motion for mt given
by (2.4); and the constraints of the household’s problem (2.6)–(2.8).
3. Calibration
Each model economy is calibrated using empirical estimates of steady-state relations among
the model’s variables and parameters. Measurements from plant-level studies and information
from U.S. labor market regulations are also used to calibrate Economy 2. The steady-state
values of the models’ variables are summarized in Table 1 and the calibrated values of the pa-
rameters in turn in Table 2.[FOOTNOTE ON DATA HERE] The steady-state relations implied
by (2.8), (2.9), (2.10), (2.14), and (2.15) are the same for the two economies. The values of
the parameters obtained from them will therefore apply to both of them. We describe their
calibration ﬁrst and then explain how we calibrate parameters not shared by the two models.16 Roman ˇ Sustek
Parameters Shared by Both Models
We interpret the length of the period as one quarter. The parameter α in the expression for
output (2.15) equals the models’ steady-state capital share of output and is set equal to 0.385.
This is in line with estimates obtained for the
United States. We use a quarterly depreciation rate equal to 0.026, which is consistent with the
U.S. long-run capital to output ratio of 8.519 and the share of investment in aggregate output
equal to 0.223. Without loss of generality, we choose units so that steady-state output is one.
For the capital to output ratio of 8.519, equation (2.15) then dictates a steady-state value of A
equal to 0.438. The discount factor θ is set equal to 0.981, a value implied by the ﬁrst-order
condition (2.10) for the rate of return 0.045 given by the pricing function (2.14).
Economy 1
The parameter b in the utility function (2.18) is speciﬁc to the benchmark economy. As in
Hansen (1985) we set the steady-state value of n equal to 0.31. The ﬁrst-order condition
(2.19) for the optimal labor-leisure choice then restricts b to be 2.516. The autocorrelation
coefﬁcient and the standard deviation of the innovation in the stochastic process for log(zt) are
set equal to 0.9 and 0.0067, respectively. These values come from a time series on the Solow
residual for the period 1959 Q1–2000 Q4.
Economy 2







and κ. Moreover, since in this economy zt is not equivalent to the Solow residual, we need to
parameterize ρz and σξ in a different way than we did for Economy 1.
We set β equal to 0.58 as in Hall (2000). Because we do not have evidence that shift lengths
differ across shifts and across regular-workweek and weekend work, we let hR
j = ho
j = h for
all j. We set h equal to 1/3, which implies that plants operate three eight-hour shifts.20













































The Fair Labor Standards Act requires that a 50 percent premium be paid for hours in excess
of 40 hours per week. We therefore set ∆o
j equal to 0.5 for all j.
There is no legal requirement for shift premia. Using data from the Area Wage Survey (AWS),
Shapiro (1986) estimates that for the period 1973–75, the average pay differential was 7.8
20 A similar assumption has been made by Hall (2000). It is supported by King and Williams (1985), who report
that three eight-hour rotating shifts are a common arrangement in U.S. manufacturing.Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 17
percent for work on the second shift and 10.3 percent for work on the third shift.21 He argues,
however, that because most ﬁrms rotate shiftwork among their workforce, a large part of the
premium needed to get workers to undertake it is built into the base wage rate. Shapiro (1995)
takes this practice into account and obtains a premium of about 25 percent. Kostiuk (1990)
ﬁnds that labor heterogeneity (such as union membership or ﬁrm size) also causes shift premia
from AWS to be seriously underestimated.22 Due to this uncertainty about the true marginal
cost of shiftwork to ﬁrms, we choose ∆R
2 and ∆R
3 , together with the standard deviations of the
idiosyncratic shocks σs and σε and the ratio of their mean values κ, so that the steady state
of the model economy is in line with the observed organization of the workweek of capital in
manufacturing.
Mattey and Strongin (1997) provide detailed analysis of the use of various margins of out-
put adjustment in manufacturing based on plant-level data from the Survey of Plant Capacity
(SPC). We use their ﬁndings for variable work-period industries (industries that primarily ad-
just production by varying the workweek of capital rather than production ﬂows).23 Mattey
and Strongin ﬁnd that 27.3 percent of plants that are open operate on average one shift, 40.4
percent operate two shifts, and 32.3 percent operate three shifts. Further, 19 percent of plants
use weekend work.
Based on their estimate of the number of weeks per quarter plants are typically open, we
calculate that the average plant is shut down for about 0.067 weeks per quarter. In our model
this means that 0.067 plants are closed for the whole period. Given the values for overtime
premia, we therefore choose values for ∆R
2 , ∆R
3 , σs, σε, and κ such that in steady state, (i) the
measure of plants (µR
1 − µR
2 ) that operate one shift is equal to (1 − 0.067) ∗ 0.273 = 0.255;
(ii) the measure of plants (µR
2 −µR
3 ) that operate two shifts is equal to 0.377; (iii) the measure
of plants µR
3 that operate three shifts is equal to 0.301; and (iv) the measure of plants µo
1 that
use weekend work is equal to 0.173. We obtain ∆R
2 equal to 0.79, ∆R
3 equal to 1.56, σs equal
to 0.851, σε equal to 0.802, and κ equal to 0.392.24 The wage premium for the second shift is
close to the value of 0.70 obtained by Hornstein (2002).
Using the observed values for overtime premia and our estimates of shift premia and of κ and
σε, we can calculate overtime work on the second and the third shift. We ﬁnd that only 0.004
measure of plants use weekend work on the second shift, and 6.602 ∗ 10−6 measure of them
use weekend work on the third shift. The steady-state distribution of plants across the various
margins of capacity utilization is summarized in Table 3.
We normalize the base wage rate ωR
1 and the minimum-stafﬁng requirement n such that Econ-
omy 2 can be interpreted as a disaggregated version of Economy 1. Note that the optimality
conditions for labor-leisure choice for Economy 2 encompass the one for Economy 1: adding
21 King and Williams (1985) obtain similar values for 1984 for the manufacturing sector and Bresnahan and
Ramey (1994) for the period 1972–83 for a panel of plants in the automobile industry.
22 Studies in Anxo et al. (1995) show that shift premia obtained by direct observation from wage data range from
5 percent in the United States to nearly 50 percent in Germany.
23 For example, assembly manufacturing, such as transportation and machinery industries, belong in this group.
Clark (1996) reports that assembly manufacturing accounts for about 20 percent of private sector output and
Corrado (1996) claims that it accounts for a large part of cyclical variation in GDP.
24 The steady state value of zt implied by the model is 2.35. The standard deviations σ s and σε therefore imply
coefﬁcients of variation equal to 0.36 and 0.87, respectively. A plant thus faces relatively greater uncertainty
about whether it will use overtime work than about how many shifts it will operate. This ﬁnding is in line with
plant-level observations on the relative frequency of use of the two margins; overtime is used more frequently
than adjustment in the number of shifts.18 Roman ˇ Sustek
the ﬁrst-order conditions (2.45) and (2.46) for Economy 2, after ﬁrst multiplying both sides of
the equations by (nR
j + no
j) and no
j, respectively, and then summing across the three shifts, we



















































Equation (3.47) implies that in light of the economy with nonconvexities, the wage rate ω in
the benchmark economy can be interpreted as the average weekly wage rate. We therefore
choose ωR
1 so that ω in the economy with nonconvexities is equal to the value of ω for the
benchmark economy. Similarly, setting n in the economy with nonconvexities equal to 0.31,
the value used for the benchmark economy, we obtain n from equation (2.40).
Using the values for ωR




j=1 from the ﬁrst-order conditions for labor-leisure choice (2.45) and (2.46).
Their values are provided in Table 2. Finally, we assign values to the autocorrelation coefﬁ-
cient and the standard deviation of the innovation in the stochastic process for log(zt) so that
the volatility of output and its autocorrelation in Economy 2 are the same as in Economy 1.
We obtain values: ρz =0 .9 and σξ =0 .009. Whereas the autocorrelation coefﬁcient for the
two economies is the same, σξ is larger for the second economy. Thus, nonconvex margins of
output adjustment at the plant level somewhat dampen aggregate ﬂuctuations. We discuss this
ﬁnding in the next section.
The distribution of plants across the various margins of capacity utilization in Table 3 can be
used to calculate the steady-state workweeks of capital and labor. The workweek of capital (as



























































Their steady-state values implied by the model are 0.464 and 0.243, respectively. In terms of
hours, capital therefore works on average 77.9 hours per week and labor 40.7 hours per week.
This is in line with U.S. experience.25
25 For example, using SPC data for the period 1974–92, Beaulieu and Mattey (1998) estimate the average work-
week ofcapital in manufacturingto be about97.0hours. Based onthe same data set, Shapiro(1996)estimates the
workweek of capital for 2-digit SIC industries. In the transportation equipment industry (an industry character-
ized by assembly production), capital operates on average for 73.6 hours a week. Estimates based on AWS data
give smaller values. For the period 1951–90 Shapiro (1996) reports an estimate of 54.5 hours for manufacturing.
His estimate of the workweek of labor for manufacturing production workers is 40.4 hours. This is close to the
steady-state value of 40.7 hours implied by the model.Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 19
4. Findings
Although we focus on the MTM, we start by examining the cyclical behavior of the two model
economies. For reasonable values of the standard deviations of innovations in the stochastic
processes (2.1) and (2.2), productivity shocks take on much greater importance than interest
rate shocks in driving aggregate ﬂuctuations in the two models. If the cyclical behavior of the
economy with nonconvexities was too different from the cyclical behavior of the U.S. econ-
omy, and the cyclical behavior of the benchmark economy, there would be no point proceeding
further with the analysis. The model of plant-level behavior in Economy 2 would be clearly
inadequate. We ﬁnd that despite some differences, the economies exhibit similar cyclical be-
havior, with the same strengths and weaknesses as standard real business cycle models. In
addition, Economy 2 is broadly consistent with plant-level observations on the relative contri-
bution of the various margins to output volatility.
After this test we compare the responses of key variables in the two economies to a 100 basis
point serially uncorrelated shock to the nominal interest rate. We carry out this experiment un-
der the assumption that the economies are initially in a steady state. For Economy 2, however,
we also investigate how the responses of output and the inﬂation rate change when aggregate
productivity shocks move the economy away from the steady state. Finally, we study the re-
sponses to highly autocorrelated interest rate shocks. Serially uncorrelated shocks generate
large liquidity effects and thus can signiﬁcantly affect aggregate output. Through inﬂation
expectations, serial correlation reduces the impact of interest rate shocks on output.
4.1 Cyclical Behavior of the Model Economies
Because our main focus is on the responses of the two economies to nominal interest rate
shocks that have potentially signiﬁcant effects on aggregate economic activity, we study the
cyclicalbehaviorof thetwo economiesfor the case ofseriallyuncorrelated interestrate shocks.
(R − 1) in the stochastic process (2.2) is set equal to 0.014, the average Federal Funds Rate
for the period 1959 Q1–2000 Q4, measured at a quarterly rate, and σζ is set equal to 0.136,
its estimate from Federal Funds Rate data for the same period. Summary statistics for the
cyclical behavior of the model economies are presented in Tables 4 and 5 and those for the
U.S. economy in Table 6.26
As we explained in the previous section, the parameters ρz and σξ of the stochastic process
for logzt for Economy 2 are chosen such that the standard deviation of output and its autocor-
relation coefﬁcient in Economy 2 are the same as in Economy 1 (subject to sampling error).
Whereas ρz turns out to be the same for the two economies, σξ in Economy 2 is larger than in
Economy 1 (0.009 compared with 0.0067). This implies that the plant-level nonconvexities in
Economy 2 somewhat reduce aggregate ﬂuctuations driven by productivity shocks. The rea-
son behind this ﬁnding is that employment in Economy 2 responds less to productivity shocks
than in Economy 1, as can be seen from the standard deviations (measured relative to that of
output) in Tables 4 and 5. Whereas in Economy 1 the relative standard deviation is 0.79, in
Economy 2 it is only 0.57. As in a standard business cycle model, in response to a productivity
shock, the representative plant in Economy 1 increases employment along the smooth demand
curve (2.13). In Economy 2 this margin is not operative. Plants increase employment only if
they ﬁnd it proﬁtable to increase the number of shifts they operate. An increase in aggregate
26 Before computing the business cycle statistics, the artiﬁcial series are transformed by taking logarithms and
ﬁltered using the Baxter and King (1999) band-pass ﬁlter. The corresponding U.S. series are transformed and
ﬁltered the same way.20 Roman ˇ Sustek
employment is then given by the measure of plants that do so. This measure, however, is not
large enough to generate a response in employment of the same magnitude as in Economy 1.
The cyclical behavior of employment in both economies is nevertheless generally in line with
U.S. experience.27 The relativestandard deviationof employmentobtained fromestablishment
survey data is 0.91, somewhat higher than in Economy 1. On the other hand, the relative
standard deviation of employment obtained from household survey data is 0.63, which is in
the ballpark of the value for Economy 2.
The cyclical behavior of output, consumption, and investment is nearly the same in the two
economies and is generally consistent with U.S. experience. The cyclical behavior of the price
level, on the other hand, is closer to the cyclical behavior of its U.S. counterpart (measured by
a GDP deﬂator) in Economy 2 than in Economy 1. In Economy 1 the price level is too volatile
and its negative contemporaneous correlation with output is much weaker than in the data.
An important aspect of Economy 2 is how well it accounts for the cyclical behavior of the
workweek of capital. Unfortunately, quarterly data on the workweek of capital are not avail-
able. Findings by Beaulieu and Mattey (1998) based on annual SPC data suggest that the
coefﬁcient of variation of the capital workweek in manufacturing is 0.0293. In our model it
is 0.0145, which is of the same order of magnitude as in the data, but clearly smaller. This
ﬁnding suggests that the model does not capture all the dynamics driving the distribution of
plants across the margins of capital utilization in response to productivity shocks.
Figure1displaystheresponsesofthemarginsofcapitalutilizationinEconomy2toa1-percent
positiveshock to zt and their contributionto the increase in aggregate output.28 In the toppanel
we see that most plants increase output by opening a second regular-time shift, a somewhat
smaller measure of plants open the third shift, and a still smaller measure of them start to
operate at least one shift. Overtime work is the least important margin. In terms of output,
the contribution of the three shifts is about the same, each accounting for roughly one third
of the increase in aggregate output. Shiftwork (i.e., adding the second or the third shift) thus
contributes to the increase in output twice as much as intermittent production (i.e., operating
the ﬁrst shift). The contribution of overtime work is negligible. Bresnahan and Ramey (1994)
ﬁnd that in the automobile industry, out of the 71.7 percent of output variation at quarterly
frequency that is attributed to variation in capital workweek for output adjustment purposes,
20.6 percent is due to intermittent production, 40.2 percent to shiftwork, and only 10.9 percent
to overtime work. Our model is consistent with the contribution of shiftwork, relative to that
of intermittent production, but underestimates the role of overtime in output adjustments.
4.2 Responses to an Interest Rate Shock from the Steady State
Figure 2 displays the responses of employment and output to an unanticipated 100 basis point
fall in the nominal interest rate in a partial equilibrium setting. (The fall is measured at an an-
nual rate, implying a fall at a quarterly rate of about 25 basis points.) Other things being equal,
a fall in the interest rate reduces labor costs (the wage bill times the gross interest rate), and
employment and output increase in both economies. In Economy 2, however, the increase in
27 Except for employment data, the series are for the period 1959 Q1–2000 Q4. Household survey data on
employment are for the period 1954 Q1–1991 Q2 and establishment survey data for the period 1964 Q1–2000
Q4.
28 The response of output is shown as a percentage deviation from steady state and the responses of the measures
as percentage-pointdeviations.Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 21
employment is 56 percent smaller and the increase in output 37 percent smaller than in Econ-
omy 1. Remember that in Economy 2 a fall in the interest rate leads to higher employment
because it increases the measure of plants that operate the three shifts; output can also increase
when the measure of plants using overtime increases. For the parameter values of idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty and overtime and shift premia consistent with the observed organization of
the capital workweek, the measure of such plants, however, is not large enough to generate
responses in aggregate employment and output of the same magnitude as in Economy 1.
Figure 3 shows the responses of key variables to the fall in the nominal interest rate in a
general equilibrium setting.29 In general equilibrium the increase in labor demand leads to
higher wages in both economies, which partly reduce the positive effect of a lower interest rate
onoutputand employment. Because the partialequilibriumincrease inemploymentislarger in
Economy 1 than in Economy 2, we would expect wages to go up more in the former economy
than in the latter. This, however, is not the case. As we can see in Figure 3, the average
wage rate in Economy 2, given by (3.47), increases more than the wage rate in Economy 1. In
general equilibrium, the quantitative differences in the responses of output and employment in
the two economies are thus even larger than in partial equilibrium: employment in Economy
2 increases 60 percent less and output 43 percent less than in Economy 1.
The large increase in the average wage rate in Economy 2 can be explained by breaking down
the response of aggregate output into the margins of capital utilization. The breakdown is
shown in Figure 4. Compared with Figure 1 the use of the margins is now different. In
particular, in terms of the measure of plants, regular-time work on the third shift is the most
important margin, followed by regular-time work on the second shift and overtimework on the
ﬁrst shift. Regular-time work on the ﬁrst shift is rather unimportant. This breakdown shows
that the interest rate shock primarily affects the output decisions of relatively more productive
plants. Because these plants can expand production further only by utilizing capital during
times when leisure is most valuable to the household, the average wage rate in Economy 2
increases more than the wage rate in Economy 1, where such “distributional” effects (in terms
of which plants are affected) of monetary policy shocks are absent.30
In terms of their contribution to aggregate output, about two thirds of the output increase is
due to the increase in the measure of plants operating the third shift, with nearly all of the
remaining part attributed to the increase in the measure of plants operating the second shift.
Turning to the other variables in Figure 3, consumption, which is proportional to wage rates by
the ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimal labor-leisure choice, increases in both economies by
nearly the same amount. As a result, investment in Economy 2 increases 60 percent less than
in Economy 1. The response of the inﬂation rate, deﬁned as (pt/pt−1 − 1), is also stronger in
Economy 1 than in Economy 2. In Economy 1 the inﬂation rate increases by 5.5 percentage
points, while in Economy 2 by only 3 percentage points. The reason for this is that demand
for loanable funds in Economy 1 (due to space constraints not included in the ﬁgure) increases
more than in Economy 2. The money market clearing condition (2.3) then requires that the
negative shock to the interest rate be accompanied by a larger injection of money balances in
29 The responses are shown as percentage deviations from steady state and the response of the inﬂation rate as
percentage-point deviations at an annual rate.
30 Plant heterogeneityand nonconvexmarginsare crucial for the large increase in wages. Preferencesfor daytime
work are not sufﬁcient. When we carry out the same experiment in an economy with the same preferences as
in Economy 2, but with a representative plant that operates the three regular-time and overtime shifts, we obtain
responses in output and employment similar to those in Economy 1.22 Roman ˇ Sustek
Economy 1 than in Economy 2. Because consumption in both economies increases by about
the same amount, the price level that clears the goods market must be higher in Economy 1
than in Economy 2.
4.3 Responses to an Interest Rate Shock Conditional on Productivity Shocks
In Figure 1 we saw that aggregate productivity shocks affect the measure of plants that uti-
lize capital along any given margin. Aggregate productivity shocks therefore also affect the
measure of the marginal plants that change their production in response to monetary policy
shocks. The responses found in the previous experiment might therefore be sensitive to the
state of aggregate productivity.
Empirical studies suggest that expansionary monetary policy has a larger (positive) effect on
aggregate output in recessions than in expansions.31 The literature has proposed two explana-
tions. According to one hypothesis this asymmetry arises due to credit constraints. According
to the other, expansionary monetary policy should have a larger effect on output in periods
of low economic activity because many ﬁrms operate below capacity. During periods of high
economic activity, on the other hand, such policy would be mainly reﬂected in higher prices
with little effect on output because capacity is tight.
Economy 2 provides a natural framework for assessing the latter hypothesis. An attractive
feature of the economy is that the concept of capacity utilization is made operational by ex-
plicitly modeling the margins along which capacity is utilized at the plant level. Furthermore,
the variation in the workweek of capital (a measure of capacity utilization in our model) over
the business cycle is of the same order of magnitude as in the data.32
We carry out two experiments. In the ﬁrst experiment, Experiment A, the economy receives a
productivityshock in period 1 followedby no other shocks in subsequent periods. We consider
both positive and negative shocks. Three magnitudes of the shocks are considered: one, two,
and three standard deviations of the innovation ξt in the stochastic process for zt. In the
second experiment, Experiment B, we consider a scenario where the economy is in a steady
state characterized by zt one, two, and three standard deviationsaway from z in each direction.
This scenario can be interpreted as the economy drawing a series of shocks that bring it to a
low (high) productivity steady state.
In each experiment we study the responses of output and the inﬂation rate to an unanticipated
100 basis point fall in the nominal interest rate. (In Experiment A the interest rate shock
occurs in the same period as the productivity shock.) The responses of output are measured
as percentage deviations and the responses of the inﬂation rate as percentage-point deviations
from the paths of output and the inﬂation rate, respectively, under no interest rate shock (but
with the productivity shock present). For a more convenient presentation of the asymmetries,
31 Using mainly Markovswitching models, such asymmetryhas been documentedfor the United States by Weise
(1999), Kakes (2000), Lo and Piger (2002), and Garcia and Schaller (2002), for a number of European countries
by Kakes (2000),Peersman and Smets (2001),and Mar´ ıa-Dolores(2002),and for the Eurozoneby Peersman and
Smets (2001) and Mar´ ıa-Dolores (2002).
32 We recognize that the margins we consider in this paper are primarily used only in some manufacturing indus-
tries, such as durable goods industries. (See Shapiro (1996) for a complete list of industries at the 2-digit SIC
level of disaggregationthat utilize capacity along the margins considered in this paper.) Nevertheless, as reported
in Clark (1996), these industries account for about 20 percent of private sector output and contributesubstantially
to its cyclical variation. Further, Shapiro (1996) ﬁnds that the workweek of capital explains about 70 percent of
the variation in capacity utilization as published by the Federal Reserve Board.Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 23
we express the deviations relative to those from the nonstochastic steady state presented in
Figure 3. Table 7 contains the results of the experiments.
In Experiment A, output increases relatively more in response to the interest rate fall in states
where the economy receives a low productivity shock than in states where it receives a high
productivity shock. The inﬂation rate, on the other hand, increases relatively more in high
productivity states than in low productivity states. Thus, at least qualitatively, the results of
ExperimentA are consistentwith the hypothesis. Quantitatively,however, the asymmetries are
rathersmall. Lookingattheextremecases, onimpactoutputincreasesonly4percentlesswhen
ξt is equal to 3σξ, and only 4 percent more when ξt is equal to −3σξ, relative to the response
from the nonstochastic steady state. The asymmetries in the responses of the inﬂation rate are
of the same order of magnitude as the asymmetries in the responses of output. In Experiment
B, the asymmetries in both the responses of output and the responses of the inﬂation rate
are qualitatively the same and of the same order of magnitude as in Experiment A. These
experiments therefore suggest that capacity constraints are an unlikely source of signiﬁcant
asymmetries in the responses of economic activity to monetary policy shocks.
4.4 Autocorrelated Interest Rate Shocks
Figure 5 displays the responses of the key variables to a 100 basis point negative shock to
the nominal interest rate when the shock is persistent. In particular, we set ρR equal to 0.96.
Notice ﬁrst that on impact consumption in both economies increases substantially more than
when the shock is serially uncorrelated (for both economies the increase is more than twice as
large). This increase can be explained by the response of the inﬂation rate. Remember that
the restriction on the household’s participation in the money market lasts for only one period.
Liquidity effects are thus present only in the impact period. Therefore, as in the case of an un-
correlated shock, the fall in the interest rate is accompanied by a rise in the money supply, and
the price level increases in the ﬁrst period (although much less than in the case of uncorrelated
shocks). In the subsequent periods the household can fully react to the interest rate shock by
adjusting its cash balances, and the inﬂation rate is determined by Fisherian fundamentals. A
lower interest rate thus implies a lower expected inﬂation rate. Because consumption must be
ﬁnanced with cash, a lower expected inﬂation tax on cash balances induces the household to
increase its consumption expenditures as in Cooley and Hansen (1989). The large increase in
consumption,which leads to proportional increases in wage rates, nearly overturnsthe positive
effect of a lower interest rate on employment and output. As a result, employment and output
in both economies increase much less than in the case of serially uncorrelated shocks. Due to
the small increase in output, investment falls in both economies.
Note that on impact output increases in both economies by nearly the same amount. Serial
correlation of the interest rate shocks thus reduces the effect of the nonconvexities on the
MTM, but it also signiﬁcantly reduces the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism in the
benchmark economy: output increases by only 0.05 percent, compared with 0.26 percent in
the case of serially uncorrelated shocks.
In Table 8 we present the asymmetries in the responses of aggregate output and the inﬂation
rate. In Experiment A, the asymmetries in the responses of output are again small. But the
asymmetries in the responses of the inﬂation rate are rather large. Looking at the extreme
cases, on impact the inﬂation rate increases 29 percent more when ξt is equal to 3σξ, and 25
percent less when ξt is equal to −3σξ, relative to the response from the nonstochastic steady
state.24 Roman ˇ Sustek
In Experiment B, the asymmetries in the responses of the inﬂation rate are even larger than
in Experiment A. The asymmetries in the responses of output are again small, but reversed
compared to Experiment A: output increases more in high productivity states than in low
productivity states. Looking again at the extreme cases, when the economy is in a steady state
characterized by zt equal to (z +3 σz), on impact output increases 14 percent more and the
inﬂation rate 83 percent more, relative to the responses from the steady state characterized by
zt equal to z; when the economy is in a steady state characterized by zt equal to (z −3σz), the
increase in output is 9 percent smaller and the increase in the inﬂation rate 63 percent smaller
compared to the responses from the steady state characterized by zt equal to z. Persistent
interest rate shocks thus generate sizeable asymmetries in the responses of the inﬂation rate,
but, as in the case of serially uncorrelated shocks, their effect on aggregate output does not
signiﬁcantly change with aggregate productivity.
5. Concluding Remarks
Micro-level empirical evidence suggests that production plants adjust output along nonconvex
margins. In thispaper we haveattemptedtoevaluatethe effectof suchmicro-levelnonconvexi-
ties on one process through which monetary policy decisions are transmitted into the economy.
To this end we have replaced the smoothaggregate productionfunctionin a prototypicalmodel
of the MTM due to Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) with heterogeneous plants that adjust
output along nonconvex margins. We have found that for parameter values consistent with
U.S. data, these nonconvexities signiﬁcantly reduce the effects of monetary policy shocks on
aggregate economic activity and prices relative to the standard model. In addition, the quanti-
tative effects of monetary policy shocks on aggregate output do not signiﬁcantly change with
the degree of capacity utilization over the business cycle.
These ﬁndings should be interpreted with three caveats in mind. First, the margins we con-
sidered are primarily used in manufacturing industries characterized by assembly production.
Our model therefore overstates the extent to which they reduce the effect of monetary policy
on output and employment in other sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, assembly manufac-
turing contributes signiﬁcantly to U.S. private sector output and its volatility, which makes it
an important sector for policies directed at stabilizing aggregate output and prices.
Second, the workweek of capital in our model is less volatile than in the U.S. economy and
the role of overtime in output adjustment is underestimated. These deviations from the data
suggest that our model does not capture all the dynamics in the distribution of plants across
the margins of capital utilization following an aggregate productivity shock. The absence of
such dynamics is likely to affect the conditional responses of the economy to monetary policy
shocks, but not the responses from the steady state.
Finally, the measure of plants that are close to being indifferent between two alternative pro-
duction schedules, and the relative size of these measures across the various cut-off points,
are crucial for the quantitative assessment of the role of the nonconvexities in the transmission
mechanism. Although there are data on the fraction of plants that operate a given shift or use
overtime, we do not know the distribution of the “distance” of the plants’ actual operations
from their preferred work schedules. In the current framework the distribution was dictated
by the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Although this is a reasonable start-
ing point, in the absence of independent measurement it would be interesting to see how our
ﬁndings change when the distribution of the distance is generated as an outcome of the model.Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 25
The current framework could be extended in two interesting ways. First, we have assumed that
the nominal interest rate follows an exogenous stochastic process. We made this assumption
in order to focus on the transmission mechanism rather than on monetary policy itself. It
would therefore be interesting to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings to the introduction of a
monetary policy feedback rule, such as the Taylor rule.
Second, in actual economies plant managers schedule overtime work or close the plant down
for a week at a time more frequently than they change the number of shifts. We have tried to
accommodate this notion by assuming that the manager observes the productivityof a straight-
time shift before he ﬁnds out the productivity of an overtime shift. But he makes the decisions
within the same period. The model could be extended to make the decisions about the uti-
lization of the margins intertemporal. This could be done, for example, by introducing auto-
correlated idiosyncratic shocks and ﬁxed costs of adjusting output along the various margins.
In such an environment plants will choose the utilization of the margins according to (S,s)
decision rules. This modiﬁcation could resolve two of the issues raised above: (i) generate
more realistic dynamics at the micro level; and (ii) endogenously generate the distribution of
the distance between actual and preferred work schedules.
Many decisions made by households and ﬁrms involve nonconvexities. For example, ﬁrm in-
vestment and household purchases of durable goods and housing investment are lumpy. Sim-
ilarly, decisions by individuals about whether to join the labor force are discrete. The general
equilibrium effects of micro-level nonconvexities have been studied previously in the context
of the business cycle. But their implications for the aggregate effects of government poli-
cies have been largely unexplored. In this paper we have focused on one type of micro-level
nonconvexities and studied their effect on the transmission of monetary policy. Our ﬁndings,
however, illustrate a more general point: In the presence of micro-level nonconvexities, care-
ful modeling of the micro behavior is crucial for the evaluation of the aggregate effects of
government policies.26 Roman ˇ Sustek
Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Responses of Margins of Capital Utilization to a 1-Percent Positive Shock to
Aggregate Productivity and Their Contribution to Aggregate Output
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Figure 2: Partial Equilibrium. Responses of Employment and Aggregate Output to a 100
Basis Point (Serially Uncorrelated) Negative Shock to the Nominal Interest Rate
Employment
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Figure 3: General Equilibrium. Responses to a 100 Basis Point (Serially Uncorrelated)
Negative Shock to the Nominal Interest Rate
Consumption Output
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Note: The inﬂation rate is expressed at an annual rate.Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 29
Figure 4: Responses of Margins of Capital Utilization to a 100 Basis Point (Serially Uncor-
related) Negative Shock to the Nominal Interest Rate and Their Contribution to Aggregate
Output
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Figure 5: Responses to a 100 Basis Point Negative Autocorrelated Shock
to the Nominal Interest Rate
Consumption Output
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Table 1: Long-Run Values of U.S. Data Used in Calibration
Symbol Value Data
Data used for both models
k 8.519 Capital to output ratio
c 0.777 Consumption to output ratio
i 0.223 Investment to output ratio
n 0.310 Share of time spent in market activities
Data for the model with non-convexities
{∆o
j}3














0.377 Fraction of plants operating two shifts
µR
3 0.301 Fraction of plants operating three shifts
µo
1 0.173 Fraction of plants using weekend work32 Roman ˇ Sustek
Table 2: Parameter Values for the Model Economies
Symbol Value Parameter
Parameters shared by both economies
α 0.385 Capital share of output
δ 0.026 Capital depreciation rate
θ 0.981 Discount factor
Benchmark model
b 2.516 Parameter for disutility from work
ρz 0.9 Persistence in the productivity shock
σξ 0.0067 Standard deviation of innovation
in the productivity process
Model with non-convexities
h 1/3 Shift length
β 0.580 Share of labor in production ﬂow
n 0.162 Minimum-stafﬁng requirement
κ 0.38 Ratio of the mean of ε to the mean of s
Parameter for disutility from work on:
bR
1 1.618 ﬁrst regular-time shift
bR
2 2.901 second regular-time shift
bR
3 4.140 third regular-time shift
bo
1 2.104 ﬁrst shift on Saturdays
bo
2 3.771 second shift on Saturdays
bo
3 5.381 third shift on Saturdays
σs 0.851 Standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock s
σε 0.802 Standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock ε
ρz 0.9 Persistence in the productivity shock
σξ 0.009 Standard deviation of innovation
in the productivity processPlant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 33
Table 3: Implied Steady-State Values for Shift Premia, Capital Utilization,
and the Workweek of Labor
Symbol Value Variable
Shift premium for work on
∆R
2 0.79 second shift
∆R
3 1.56 third shift
Measure of plants operating
µR
1 0.933 ﬁrst shift
µR
2 0.679 second shift
µR
3 0.301 third shift
Measure of plants using Saturday work on
µo
1 0.173 ﬁrst shift
µo
2 0.004 second shift
µo
3 6.602×10−6 third shift
hk 0.464 (77.9 hours) Workweek of capital
hl 0.243 (40.7 hours) Workweek of labor (conditional on
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Table 7: Responses of Aggregate Employment and Output to an Unexpected 100
Basis Point (Serially Uncorrelated) Cut in the Nominal Interest Rate under Fixed
Prices
Economy 1 Economy 2 Ratio
Employment 0.62 0.27 0.44
Output 0.38 0.24 0.63
Table 8: Asymmetries in the Responses of Output and Inﬂation in Economy 2 to a
100 Basis Point Negative Shock to the Nominal Interest Rate; ρR =0
Experiment A
yt(3σξ)/yt 0.96 πt(3σξ)/πt 1.06
yt(2σξ)/yt 0.97 πt(2σξ)/πt 1.04
yt(σξ)/yt 0.98 πt(σξ)/πt 1.02
yt 0.15 πt 3.00
yt(−σξ)/yt 1.01 πt(−σξ)/πt 0.98
yt(−2σξ)/yt 1.03 πt(−2σξ)/πt 0.97
yt(−3σξ)/yt 1.04 πt(−3σξ)/πt 0.95
Experiment B
yt(3σz)/yt 0.97 πt(3σz)/πt 1.04
yt(2σz)/yt 0.97 πt(2σz)/πt 1.03
yt(σz)/yt 0.98 πt(σz)/πt 1.02
yt 0.15 πt 3.00
yt(−σz)/yt 1.02 πt(−σz)/πt 0.98
yt(−2σz)/yt 1.06 πt(−2σz)/πt 0.97
yt(−3σz)/yt 1.10 πt(−3σz)/πt 0.9536 Roman ˇ Sustek
Table 9: Responses Under a Smaller Dispersion of Idiosyncratic Shocks; σs =0 .5
Fixed prices
Economy 1 Economy 2
(baseline) (σs =0 .5)
Employment 0.62 0.27 0.32
Output 0.38 0.24 0.31
General equilibrium
Economy 1 Economy 2
(baseline) (σs =0 .5)
Employment 0.42 0.17 0.15
Output 0.26 0.15 0.15
Consumption 0.08 0.09 0.12
Investment 0.90 0.37 0.21
Wage rate 0.08 0.16 0.20
Inﬂation rate 5.60 3.00 3.72
Table 10: Responses Under a Smaller Dispersion of Idiosyncratic Shocks; σs =
0.5, bR
2 =3 .5, bR
3 =3 .9
Fixed prices




Employment 0.62 0.27 0.46
Output 0.38 0.24 0.44
General equilibrium




Employment 0.42 0.17 0.31
Output 0.26 0.15 0.29
Consumption 0.08 0.09 0.08
Investment 0.90 0.37 1.07
Wage rate 0.08 0.16 0.21
Inﬂation rate 5.60 3.00 9.38Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 37
Table 11: Asymmetries in the Responses of Output and Inﬂation in Economy 2 to




y(3σξ)/yt 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.01
yt(2σξ)/yt 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.01
yt(σξ)/yt 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
yt 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
yt(−σξ)/yt 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
yt(−2σξ)/yt 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99
yt(−3σξ)/yt 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.99
πt(3σξ)/πt 1.29 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
πt(2σξ)/πt 1.19 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
πt(σξ)/πt 1.09 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
πt 0.34 -0.66 -0.64 -0.62 -0.59 -0.57 -0.55 -0.53
πt(−σξ)/πt 0.91 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
πt(−2σξ)/πt 0.83 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
πt(−3σξ)/πt 0.75 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01
Experiment B
y(3σz)/yt 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.14
yt(2σz)/yt 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09
yt(σz)/yt 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
yt 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
yt(−σz)/yt 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
yt(−2σz)/yt 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
yt(−3σz)/yt 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
πt(3σz)/πt 1.83 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
πt(2σz)/πt 1.54 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02
πt(σz)/πt 1.26 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
πt 0.34 -0.66 -0.64 -0.62 -0.59 -0.57 -0.55 -0.53
πt(−σz)/πt 0.76 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
πt(−2σz)/πt 0.55 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
πt(−3σz)/πt 0.37 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.9138 Roman ˇ Sustek
Appendix: Computation of the Equilibria
In this appendix we describe how we compute the equilibria of the two model economies.33
For each economy we need to compute aggregate decision rules and pricing functions that
generate stochastic sequences of allocations and prices that satisfy the economy’s equilibrium
conditions. Because we are interested not only in the “average” effects of monetary policy
shocks on real activity and prices, but also in how these effects differ conditionally on aggre-
gate productivity shocks, we need to use computational methods that preserve any potential
nonlinearities in the decision rules and pricing functions. A (log)-linear approximation, proba-
bly the most popular computational tool in applied macroeconomics, is in our case inadequate.
Suppose, for example, that an interest rate cut has a larger (positive) effect on aggregate output
in states where aggregate productivity is low. A linear approximation to the decision rule for
output, such as
yt = a0 + a1zt + a2Rt + a3kt + a4mt,
would not pick up the state-dependent effects because it ignores the effect of zt on the coefﬁ-
cient a2.
A suitable method for our purposes is the projection method (sometimes also referred to as
the weighted residual method) described in Judd (1992). In particular, we use the collocation
technique. The projection method allows us to compute approximations such as








t + .... .
The nonlinear terms on the right-hand side of the equation (which can also include monomials
of higher than second order) pick up nonlinear relations between output and the state variables
which a linear approximation would miss.34 Rewriting the right-hand side of the equation as
yt = ... + a2Rt + .... ,
where





we see that the projection method allows us to compute apparently linear rules with state-
dependent coefﬁcients.
Before we apply the projection method to our model, we reduce the model’s size in two re-
spects. First, we reduce the dimension of the state-space in order to mitigate the curse of
dimensionality. There are four (continuous) state variables in our economies: zt, Rt, kt, and
mt. By appropriate normalization of nominal variables, we can eliminate mt from this set: we
divide pt, mt, qt, and Xt in the equations that characterize the equilibria by mt; then we deﬁne
new variables   pt ≡ pt/mt,   q ≡ qt/mt, and   x ≡ mt+1/mt.
Second, projection methods require the user to solve the nonlinear system of equations that
characterize the equilibrium of an economy at a number of nodes in the state space. In order
33 A Matlab code is available from the author on request.
34 In the actual computation we use Chebyshev polynomials instead of the ordinary polynomials used in this
example.Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 39
to simplify this step, we reduce the number of equilibrium conditions by substitutions. First,
we eliminate   pt by substitutionfrom the cash-in-advance constraint, which after normalization
has the form
  ptct =   xt. (A1)










































Further, we can write the money market equilibrium condition (2.3), after we have substituted
for et,a s
  xt =[ 1−   et]
−1   qt. (A4)
Here





























jt are given by (2.30) and (2.33), with the wage rates eliminated by substitu-
tions from the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions (2.45) and (2.46). Finally, we eliminate rt+1




shifted one period forward. Here At is given by equation (2.16) for Economy 1 and equation
(2.38) for Economy 2.
In order to form expectations about the future state of the economy, the household uses the
laws of motion (2.1) and (2.2) to forecast zt and Rt, respectively, and the law of motion
kt+1 = Atk
α
t +( 1− δ)kt − ct (A6)
to forecast the capital stock. Here again, At is given by equations (2.16) or (2.38), depending
on which economy we want to compute.35
After these substitutions, we are left with just two Euler equations in two unknowns, ct and   qt.
The objects we need to compute are approximationsto the decision rules ct = c(zt,R t,k t) and
  qt = q (zt,k t,R t−1) that satisfy the two Euler equations. First, however, the Euler equations
35 The law of motion for the capital stock (A6) is the goods market clearing condition. Although this equilibrium
condition is not used in the deﬁnitions of the equilibria of our model economies, we know that it holds by Walras
law.40 Roman ˇ Sustek
themselves have to be approximated because the expectations in (A2) and (A3) do not have
closed-form solutions. We approximate them using a Gauss-Hermite quadrature with seven




















Neither the measures nor the means have closed-form solutions. For the measures we use an





0.5 − Φ(  εt) if   εt < 0
0.5+Φ (   εt) if   εt ≥ 0,
where
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and






The truncated mean of ε is then obtained using Bagby’s approximation as
  ∞
φjt













The same method is used to approximate µR
jt and the truncated mean of s.
The decision rules ct = c(zt,R t,k t) and   qt = q (zt,k t,R t−1) are then approximated by func-
tions







aijkΨi (zt)Ψ j (Rt)Ψ k (kt)







bijkΨi (zt)Ψ j (kt)Ψ k (Rt−1)Plant-Level Nonconvexities and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 41
where Ψi (zt) ≡ Ti−1 (2((zt − zm)/(zM − zm)) − 1). Here Ti−1 is the ith-order Chebyshev
polynomial and zm and zM are the lower and upper bounds for zt. Ψj (Rt) and Ψk (kt) are
deﬁned similarly.36
The unknowns of the computational procedure are the coefﬁcients of the approximate deci-
sion rules {a111...aijk...annn} and {b111...bijk...bnnn}. Using the collocation technique, the
unknowns are obtained as a solution to a system of 2n3 equations in 2n3 unknowns: each Eu-
ler equation is evaluated on n3 nodes in the state space. These nodes are the ordered pairs of n
Chebyshev zeros in each dimension of the state space.
The solution is obtained in three steps. We start with n =2 . First, we make an initial guess
about the coefﬁcients. We choose them so that the decision rules are linear and pass through
the steady state. In addition, we require that ct and   qt are zero when either zt or kt is zero.
Then, we carry out a couple of iterations using the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm (see Judd,
1998, p. 119) in order to get “near” the solution. The solution is ﬁnally obtained with Powell’s
method(see Judd,1998, p. 173), whichtakestheoutputof theLevenberg-Marquardtalgorithm
as its input. The solution for n =2is then used as an initial guess for n =3 . We know
from the Chebyshev Approximation Theorem that as n →∞ ,   c(zt,R t,k t) → c(zt,R t,k t)
and   q(zt,k t,R t−1) → q(zt,k t,R t−1) uniformly. Further, as n →∞ , the coefﬁcients of the
monomials with an increasingly higher order go to zero. For our economies, n =2is, in fact,
sufﬁcient; the marginal improvement in the precision in the decision rules when n is increased
to 3 is near zero. The approximations to the decision rules we use thus have the form
c = a111 + a112k + a121R + a122Rk
+ a211z + a212zk + a221zR + a222zRk
q = b111 + b112k + b121R + b122Rk
+ b211z + b212zk + b221zR + b222zRk.
36 Thelowerandupperboundsforthestate variablesarechosensuchthatwith99percentconﬁdencethe variables
stay within the bounds.42 Roman ˇ Sustek
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